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1
Competing visions of a Medicare prescription drug benefit
often differ dramatically in their treatment of low-income groups.
2
The profound implications of this treatment spread far beyond
access to medical care, even reaching the process of technological
innovation through which new drugs are produced. Low-income
subsidies 3 under proposed versions of the Medicare prescription
drug benefit will significantly alter the incentives pharmaceutical
manufacturers face, possibly resulting in the unexpected
emergence of more innovative drugs from the R&D process as
4research focuses on the special needs of low-income groups.
1 J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2005. The author
would like to thank Professors Scott Baker and Gail Agrawal for their valuable
advice and comments.
2 See Prescription Drug and Medicare Improvement Act of 2003, S. 1, 108th
Cong. (2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov; Medicare Prescription Drug
and Modernization Act of 2003, H.R. 1, 108th Cong. (2003); see also
Strengthening Medicare: A Framework to Modernize and Improve Medicare, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/medicare (last visited Nov. 9, 2003)
(outlining the White House's version of a prescription drug plan) (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology).
3 Both S. I and H.R. 1 offer subsidies at various levels above the poverty line.
Additionally, the inclusion of beneficiaries enrolled in both Medicaid and
Medicare within the prescription drug benefit, referred to as "dual-enrollees," or
"dual-eligibles" will be considered a "subsidy." Enrollees in Medicare who do
not qualify for Medicaid, but who have incomes below seventy-four percent of
poverty (the typical cut-off for Medicaid eligibility), will be referred to as "near-
poor."
4 For descriptions of both the innovative process and the regulatory apparatus
that attends it, see generally DONNA E. SHALALA, ET AL., FROM TEST TUBE TO
PATIENT: IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH HUMAN DRUGS, U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/whatwedo/testtube-full.pdf
(Marcia L. Trenter ed., 1999) (providing general overview of FDA regulatory
process) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); see
also MICHIE HUNT, THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH CARE
The different prescription drug benefit proposals highlight
the impact of law and policy in shaping the course of science,
healthcare, and the socioeconomic status of Americans. Among
the many economic consequences of such a benefit, significant
changes will occur in the technological innovation of new drugs as
manufacturers respond and adapt to a different marketplace. 5
Evidence suggests that two primary forces will drive research
toward more innovative outcomes. First, better access to drugs for
low-income Medicare beneficiaries will increase drug demand and
ease financial pressure on pharmaceutical producers to boost
profits via minor variations of existing product lines.6 Second, for
a variety of reasons, aging low-income groups tend to be in poorer
health than their higher-income peers, resulting in greater demand
for technologically complex drugs.7
The Medicare prescription drug plan is a massive piece of
legislation containing many controversial and complex provisions.
This Recent Development will describe the impact of the treatment
of low-income beneficiaries, including both "dual-eligibles" 8 and
MANAGEMENT RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, CHANGING
PATTERNS OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION (Nancy Chockley ed., 2002)
(describing the FDA prioritization system and the various "levels" of
innovation).
5 Stimulating market demand is a well-known effect of government expenditure
programs. See WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, ECONOMICS: A CONTEMPORARY
INTRODUCTION, ANNOTATED INSTRUCTOR'S EDITION 103-04 (4th ed. 1997); see
also ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, TEACHINGS FROM THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHY
276-79, 292-93 (1996) (outlining economist'J.M. Keynes' views on society's
propensity to consume and the ability of the government to stimulate this).
6 See HUNT, supra note 4, at 15-16.
7 This tendency is generally accounted for by reference to limited medical care
in other areas. Higher income groups tend to have a higher level of preventive
health maintenance, better access to medical information, etc. The availability
of financial resources is a strong predictor of overall health. See Jo C. PHELAN
& BRUCE G. LINK, RESEARCH IN PROFILE, WHEN INCOME AFFECTS OUTCOME:
SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND HEALTH, 2 (Robert Wood Johnson Found.
Investigation Awards in Health Policy Research, Research in Profile, Issue 6,
2003), at http://www.ihhcpar.rutgers.edu/rwjfdownloads/research in
profilesiss06_feb2003.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
8 Dual-eligibles or "dual-enrollees" are beneficiaries who qualify for both
Medicare and Medicaid benefits.
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the "near-poor," 9 on pharmaceutical innovation in the House and
Senate proposals. If manufacturers shift the focus of their research
toward more innovative technology, the resulting benefits to
society will play an important role in offsetting the costs of such
coverage.
In June of 2003, both Houses of Congress passed versions
of a prescription drug coverage amendment to Medicare.' 0
Americans overwhelmingly support a prescription drug benefit
provision; a 2003 survey indicated that sixty percent believed that
Congress should enact some sort of drug benefit." Dramatic
increases in drug-related spending over recent years have spurred
political impetus for these plans. 12
Not only is growth in prescription drug spending
increasing, but the drugs are increasingly costly. 1 Pharmaceutical
spending growth jumped from 1.1% in 1980 to 8.2% in 1990,
hitting an alarming 17% by 1999.14 Additionally, the Bureau of
Labor Statistics calculated an average 4.9% increase in the
9 The near-poor are individuals with incomes below 200% of poverty, but who
do not meet the minimum income and asset requirements to qualify for
Medicare benefits.
'
0 See generally S. 1; H.R. 1.
11 THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION/HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH,
MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG SURVEY, Chart 1, at http://www.kff.org/content
/2003/20030903a/3374chartpack.pdf (Aug. 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
12 See Patricia M. Danzon & Mark V. Pauly, Health Insurance the Growth in
Pharmaceutical Expenditures, 45 J.L. & ECON. 587 (2002). For a general
overview of prescription drug spending trends in recent years, see also KAISER
FAMILY FOUNDATION/HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, MEDICARE AND
PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING CHARTPACK, figs.9-10, at http://www.kff.org
/content/2003/6087/6087v4.pdf (June 2003) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology) (analyzing projected increase in Medicare
beneficiary expenditures) [hereinafter CHARTPACK]; see also KAISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION, PRESCRIPTION DRUG TRENDS: A CHARTBOOK UPDATE, 18, at
http://www.kff.org/content/2001/3112/RxChartbook.pdf (Nov. 2001) (tracking
increases in pharmaceutical expenditures relative to other health care services)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
13 Danzon & Pauly, supra note 12, at 587-88.
14 Id. The improved efficacy of many drugs may be one explanation for this
increase in consumption, as is the increasing breadth of prescription drug
insurance coverage.
producer price index ("PPI") for the pharmaceutical industry from
1987-2002, compared with an average 1.95% increase in the PPI
across all manufacturing industries.' In the absence of a drug
benefit, average out-of-pocket expenditures for Medicare
beneficiaries are projected to rise from $999 in 2003 to $1,454 in
2006.16
I. The Proposed Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit
In 2003, Congress attempted to address the increasing
medical expenses of America's seniors by establishing a
prescription drug benefit plan. Each house offered a different plan,
and they currently are in committee debate as lawmakers attempt
to reconcile key differences in the bills, such as the treatment of
dually-enrolled beneficiaries.'1 7 Legislators, however, are having
great difficulty reaching agreement and a vote on the final version
of the bill is difficult to forecast.
1 8
15 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Producer Price Indexes, at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-
bin/surveymost?pc (last visited Nov. 9, 2003). Accounting for some (but not
all) of the rapid growth in pharmaceutical PPI was a sudden spike in prices for
psychotherapeutics, a small but significant class analyzed by the BLS when
calculating PPI. For a more detailed evaluation of the impact of
psychotherapeutics across the pharmaceutical industry, see Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Special Notice for Prescription Drugs Index, at http://www.bls.gov
/ppi/ppidrug.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
16 CHARTPACK, supra note 12, at fig.10.
17 See KaiserNetwork.org, Daily Health Policy Report: Group of Medicare
Negotiators Reportedly Reach Compromise on Allowing Medicare Drug
Coverage for Dual-Eligibles (Oct. 2, 2003), at http://kaisemetwork.org
/dailyreports/repindex.cfm?DR ID=20155 (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
18 See Julie Rovner & Emily Heil, TANF Reauthorized, Gregg Pessimistic On
Medicare Odds, CONGRESS DAILY, Oct. 1, 2003. Although Congress is
attempting to reconcile the significant differences in the two plans, compromise
appears unlikely in the short term. If a vote is forced before certain key
differences are worked out, it is probable that the benefit will be blocked
altogether. Other significant stumbling blocks for the benefit include means-
testing, and a provision that would allow Medicare to compete with private
supplemental insurance programs. For a description of the debate, and possible
compromises that may emerge, see Steve Tumham, Barring changes, Dems
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At present, Medicare consists of Part A, which covers
inpatient and critical access hospital costs, as well as short-term or
rehabilitative nursing home costs, and Part B, which covers
doctors' services and outpatient hospital costs.19 Beneficiaries
enroll separately in the two parts, and there is no premium for Part
A enrollees who paid Medicare taxes during their working years.
20
Beneficiaries pay $840 for hospital stays up to 60 days, $210 per
day for 60-90 days stays, $420 per day for 91-150 days, and all
costs for hospital stays above 150 days. 2 The monthly Part B
premium is $58.70 per month.22 Enrollees pay a $100 deductible
per calendar year for medical services plus 20% of after-deductible
expenses.23
With limited exceptions, the Medicare plan does not cover
prescription drugs.24 Qualified beneficiaries may enroll in a
Medicare + Choice plan at an extra cost and receive coverage for
portions of prescription drug costs. 25 Additionally, certain
Medigap plans offer some prescription drug benefits.26 These
plans typically are too expensive for low-income groups.
27
'unable to support'prescription drug bill, at http://www.cnn.com/2003
/ALLPOLITICS/10/23/congress.medicare/index.html (Oct. 23, 2003) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
"9Id. at 11.
20Id. at 12.
21 Id. at 31.
22[d. at 11.
23 Id. at 12.
24 Id. at 23. Some outpatient drugs are covered, such as certain oral cancer
medications.
25 For an overview of Medicare + Choice plans, see id. at 43-47.
26 See id. at 43. For a general description of Medigap plans, see CENTER FOR
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, MEDIGAP POLICIES: THE BASICS, at
http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/medigapbasics.pdf (2001) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
27 See THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE
PROPOSED MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT: A DETAILED REVIEW OF
IMPLICATIONS FOR DUAL-ELIGIBLES AND OTHER LOW-INCOME MEDICARE
BENEFICIARIES, 14, at http://www.kff.org/content/2003/4135/4135.pdf (Sept.
2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology)
[hereinafter Review for Dual-Eligibles].
Medicaid offers a limited prescription drug benefit,28 but Medicare
beneficiaries with incomes or assets above approximately 74% of
poverty do not qualify for Medicaid plans, and additionally may be
unable to afford supplemental Medicare insurance. 29 These low-
income individuals typically fall into one of several categories
referred to as near-poor and receive varying levels of
subsidization under the prescription drug proposals. More than
half of Medicare beneficiaries fell below the 200% line of poverty
in 2001, amounting to more than 19 million beneficiaries. 3 Only
5.8 million of these qualified for prescription drug coverage under
Medicaid as dual-eligibles.32
The House and Senate plans share a number of common
features, including voluntary enrollment, a universal drug benefit
with significant support for low-income beneficiaries, monthly
premiums of approximately $35, overall costs of approximately
$400 billion over 10 years, and the creation of a new agency within
the Department of Health and Human Services to administer the
drug benefit. 33 There are, however, significant differences. The
Senate bill, S. 1, features a $35 per month premium with a $275
deductible and 50% coinsurance 34 between $275 and $4,500.
Meanwhile, the House bill, H.R. 1, includes a $35 monthly
premium and a $250 deductible, with a 20% coinsurance rate
between $250 and $2,000. Above S. 1 's initial coverage limit of
28 For an overview of the Medicaid benefit structure, see CENTER FOR MEDICARE
AND MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE: A BRIEF SUMMARY, at
http://cms.hhs.gov/publications/overview-medicare-medicaid/default4.asp (last
modified Sept. 25, 2003).
29 See Review for Dual-Eligibles, supra note 27, at 14-15.
30 See, e.g., id. at 15.
31 See id. at 14.
32 Id. at 4.
33 THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, THE CURRENT MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION
DRUG DEBATE: BRIEFING CHARTS, figs.5-6, at http://www.kff.org/content
/2003/6096/6096.pdf (2003) [hereinafter CURRENT MEDICARE DEBATE]; see
also Prescription Drug and Medicare Improvement Act of 2003, S. 1, 108th
Cong. (2003); Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 2003, H.R.
1, 108th Cong. (2003).
34 Coinsurance is a pay-per-use method of cost sharing, wherein the patient pays
a percentage of costs per prescription filled.
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$4,500,35 beneficiaries must pay out-of-pocket until expenses reach
the stop-loss threshold of $5,812.50. Then, Medicare resumes
coverage with a 10% coinsurance rate.36 This gap in coverage is
known as the "hole in the doughnut." 37 H.R. 1 differs dramatically
on this point, with an initial coverage limit of $2,00038 and a stop-
loss threshold of $4,900, a significantly larger hole in the
doughnut.39 Dual-enrollees in Medicaid retain their Medicaid
coverage under S. 1, and are not eligible for a Medicare drug
benefit.4 0 Under H.R. 1, dual-enrollees may enroll in the drug
benefit, with Medicaid serving as a wraparound.4 1 The differing
treatment of low-income individuals is of particular significance.
S. 1 allows beneficiaries to qualify for "low-income" coverage at
higher levels of income than H.R. 1, due to its exclusion of dual-
enrollees. Thus, according to Congressional Budget Office
("CBO") estimates, the Senate plan would cover approximately 4.5
million fewer low-income beneficiaries.42 However, S. 1 gives its
low-income beneficiaries significantly greater depth of coverage
given the significantly higher initial coverage limit.
4 3
Since beneficiaries must live well below the poverty line in
order to qualify for Medicaid coverage, dual-enrollees are
significantly poorer than other Medicare beneficiaries. More than
70% of dual-enrollees have annual incomes below $10,000,
" S. 1, § 1860D-6(c)(3).
36 CURRENT MEDICARE DEBATE, supra note 33, at figs.5-6.
37 See HEALTH POLICY ALTERNATIVES, INC., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION, PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE FOR MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES:
A SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF S. 1. AND H.R. 1, at http://www.kff.org
/content/2003/6103/6103.pdf (July 2003) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
38 H.R. 1, § 1860D-2(b)(3).
39 See, e.g., Review for Dual-Eligibles, supra note 27, at 19.
40 See id., at 19-20.
41 Id. at 8.
42 THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, ISSUE PAPER: A PRESCRIPTION DRUG
BENEFIT IN MEDICARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDICAID AND LOW-INCOME
MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES, at http://www.kff.org/content/2003/4136/4136.pdf,
at 4 (2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology)
[hereinafter ISSUE PAPER].
43 See Review for Dual-Eligibles, supra note 27, at 19-20.
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compared to 13% of all other Medicare beneficiaries.44 Those
near-poor beneficiaries who do not qualify for Medicaid assistance
are likely to either avoid the costs of more expensive medication or
skip doses in order to prolong their supply of already-purchased
prescriptions.
45
II. The Process of Pharmaceutical Innovation
The process of pharmaceutical innovation is both risky and
costly, but with a potentially huge payoff both for the research
firms and the society that stands to benefit from them.46 For
example, in 2002, Pharmaceuticals Research and Manufacturers of
American ("PhRMA") estimated its domestic drug sales (for both
prescription and over-the-counter drugs) at $145,213,400. 4' The
U.S. pharmaceutical industry has increased its R&D expenditures
as a percentage of domestic sales from 12% in 1970 to 18.2% in
2002.48 Pharmaceutical manufacturers are highly sensitive to the
projected demand for their products, given the high capital outlay
required for drug research and the inherently risky nature of the
process.49 As a result of this high outlay, drug manufacturers do
not charge the marginal cost of drug production, but instead
allocate their total R&D costs by increasing the price of each pill
that actually reaches the market. 50 The support a Medicare plan
offers to low-income beneficiaries will dramatically shift demand
for drugs consumed in large quantities by this population.
51
Accordingly, pharmaceutical research will direct itself toward this
44 ISSUE PAPER, supra note 42, at 2.
45 Review for Dual-Eligibles, supra note 27, at 15.
46 See, e.g., Stephen R. Latham, Pharmaceutical Costs: An Overview and
Analysis of Legal and Policy Responses by the States, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 141,
147-48 (2003).
47 PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA
("PHRMA"), PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 2003, 79, at
http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/profileO2/index.cfm (2003) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
481 d. at 79.
49 See Latham, supra note 46, at 147-148.
50 id.
51 Danzon & Pauly, supra note 12, at 602; see also HEILBRONER, supra note 5,
at 276 (describing the impact of government expenditures on consumption).
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expanded market, possibly altering the level of innovation seen in
new drugs, as manufacturers focus their research toward the needs
of low-income consumers.
5 2
The FDA classifies new drug applications ("NDAs") in two
ways: chemical type and therapeutic potential.53 Drugs that offer
substantial advances over existing compounds are given a priority
classification, while those offering no significant improvement are
given a standard classification. 54 NDAs with active ingredients
that have never been approved by the FDA are termed new
molecular entities ("NMEs"), those that feature an already-
approved active ingredient or a slightly modified close chemical
derivative are termed incrementally modified drugs ("IMDs"), and
drugs with an identical approved active ingredient are "other
drugs., 55 The FDA seeks to process priority applications within
six months, whereas standard applications have a 10-12 month
completion goal.56
The relative levels of drug innovation can be inferred by
this system of prioritization. The "most innovative" drugs are
priority NMEs, which feature new, previously-unapproved active
ingredients and significantly increased therapeutic potential over
existing medications.57 Drugs then proceed from most to least
innovative accordingly: standard NMEs, priority IMDs, standard
IMDs, and other drugs. 58 During 1989-2000, fifteen percent of
new drugs introduced were rated as priority NMEs, twenty percent
were standard NMEs, eight percent were priority IMDs, forty-six
percent were standard IMDs, and eleven percent were classified as
"other drugs.",59 These figures show that only thirty-five percent of
new drugs introduced during this time featured previously
52 See HUNT, supra note 4, at 15-17.
53 U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 35.54 Id. at 35.
55 HUNT, supra note 4, at 4.56 CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FDA's DRUG REVIEW AND
APPROVAL TIMES, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/reports/reviewtimes/default.htm
(last updated July 30, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
57 HUNT, supra note 4, at 7.
58 id.
59 Id. at 9.
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
unapproved active ingredients. The remaining sixty-five percent
represent incremental shifts in technology.
60
The prevalence of incremental technology over this time
period is the product of numerous influences. Pharmaceutical
firms are under pressure to increase profits while limiting massive
R&D outlays.6' The introduction of generics and the loss of patent
protection severely erodes the profitability of older "blockbuster"
drugs, leading manufacturers to focus on extending intellectual
property protection 62 and to reduce capital expenditures by
introducing less "innovative" products featuring the same active
ingredients as established brands, but offering more convenient use
or reduced side effects.
63
III. The Role of the Prescription Drug Benefit in
Stimulating Innovation
A prescription drug benefit may expand the market for
newer drugs by encouraging low-income patients to switch from
older, cheaper drugs to new, more expensive drugs.64 Additional
factors, both beneficial and detrimental, will further increase low-
income demand for drugs. 6 5 This expanded market will induce
drug manufacturers to seek realization of profits from this sector,
spurring innovation.
At present, near-poor Medicare beneficiaries are uniquely
vulnerable to under-use of drugs. 66 This population is
"simultaneously more likely to be sick, less likely to have private
Medigap" or employer-provided prescription plans, "not poor
enough to qualify for Medicaid" support, yet not wealthy enough
60 See, e.g., HUNT, supra note 4, at 15-16.
61 See, e.g., PHRMA, supra note 47, at 76.
62 HUNT, supra note 4, at 15-16.
63 See id.
64 See Danzon & Pauly, supra note 12, at 602.
65 As discussed below, these factors include moral hazard and publicly
subsidized demand stimulation, leading to inflation of prices. See infra note 72
and accompanying text.
66 See Review for Dual-Eligibles, supra note 28, at 15.
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to purchase all the drugs they require.6 7 Low-income subsidies
would serve to mitigate this under-use, increasing consumption,
perhaps dramatically. Medicare beneficiaries are projected to
spend $134 billion in 2006; 68 more than half of current Medicare
beneficiaries fall below 200% of the poverty line and would be
assisted by low-income subsidies. 69 A study of pharmaceutical use
and socioeconomic status in Winnipeg indicated that the lowest
income quintile consumed significantly more prescriptions than
did higher quintiles; additionally the proportion of users to
residents was higher, as was intensity of use by type of drug and
expenditure per resident.7 °
Several characteristics unique to the health care
marketplace, including the prescription drug industry, distort the
typical supply and demand relationship present in most markets.
The provision of insurance insulates the consumer from the cost of
his consumption, leading to above-optimal consumption 71 and
over-utilization of healthcare. This phenomenon is known as
"moral hazard., 72 Its causes and effects are well documented in
the study of insurance and economics, and it represents the most
significant distorting factor caused by the provision of insurance
67 See Alyce S. Adams, Stephen B. Soumerai, & Dennis Ross-Degnan, The Case
for a Medicare Drug Coverage Benefit: A Critical Review of the Empirical
Evidence, 22 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH. 49, 49 (2001).
68 See CHARTPACK, supra note 12, at fig. 13.
69 See Review for Dual-Eligibles, supra note 27, at 14-15.
70 See Colleen Metge et al., The Population's Use of Pharmaceuticals, 37(6)
MED. CARE 42, 49 (Supp. 1999). This is notable, as Canada's prescription drug
coverage is often cited as a possible model for an American plan. Although the
provisions in S. 1 and H.R. 1 currently are not as generous as the Canadian
coverage for lower-income groups, the effect on low-income drug consumption
may be similar.
71 Prices are at their optimal level where marginal benefit equals marginal cost.
Where prices exceed optimal levels, there is an increased social cost for
consumption of a good. In essence, consumers are not faced with the full price
of their actions, leading them to consume more than would occur in a perfect
market scenario. See THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 262 (4th
ed. 1992).
72 Moral hazard is defined as "the effect of certain types of insurance systems in
causing a divergence between the private marginal cost of some action and the
marginal social cost of that action thus resulting in an allocation of resources
which is not optimal." Id. at 291.
generally, and by public insurance in particular. 73 Moral hazard is
typically treated as a negative effect, as it generally results in
inefficient pricing and consumption,74 resulting in higher
consumption than the normal interaction of supply and demand.75
Moral hazard presents a problem for economists and policy makers
alike, and its negative effects, particularly inflated prices and
expenditures, are of the utmost importance when defining the
parameters of a major public insurance plan such as Medicare.76
Imperfect information in the hands of consumers is an
additional factor that distorts the medical industry. 77 Patients
rarely make their own decisions concerning pharmaceuticals,
relying instead on physicians to determine the best course of
treatment. These and other factors have the effect of making "drug
demand stronger and less price-elastic than it might otherwise
be. , 78
Given the propensity of dual-eligible and "near-poor"
beneficiaries to experience more severe illnesses and require more
73 See Michael Chernew, General Equilibrium and Marketability in the Health
Care Industry, 73 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L., 885, 888 (2001); see also Mark
V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard, 58 AM. ECON. REv. 531, 535 (1968)
(describing moral hazard); see generally Willard G. Manning et al., Health
Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized
Experiment, 77 AM. ECON. REv. 251, 251 (1987) (analyzing health care
decisions and the impact of insurance).
74 See Chernew, supra note 73, at 888.
75 See Danzon & Pauly, supra note 12, at 611. Danzon and Pauly conclude that
between one-fourth and one-half of the total growth in pharmaceutical spending
between 1987 and 1996 may be accounted for by a direct moral hazard effect.
Id.
76 See Sherry A. Glied, Health Insurance and Market Failure since Arrow, 26 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 957, 960 (2001).
77 F.M. Scherer, Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 99 (1993).78Id. The price elasticity of demand is defined as "the responsiveness of the
quantity demanded of a good to its own price." MIT DICTIONARY, supra note
71, at 342 (A relatively elastic demand curve for a good indicates higher
substitutability; consumers respond to price increases by reducing their
consumption of the more expensive substitute.).
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 5
FALL 2003] PROPOSED MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT 93
prescriptions to treat them,79 an expansion of the low-income
market could lessen the impetus toward incremental technological
innovation in the pharmaceutical field.80 Stimulating low-income
demand will offer manufacturers additional incentives to focus on
more innovative pharmaceutical technology in two important
ways. First, the addition of this consumer base alone will provide
a greater profit margin to drug companies, which will relax
pressure to pad margins by pushing incremental improvements in
already-approved drugs.8 1 Second, the already-noted tendency of
the lowest income groups to consume more prescriptions per
beneficiary, resulting from a higher likelihood of severe illnesses,8
2
and to require more complex (and often multi-systemic)
83 demau
medications, provides manufacturers incentive to explore and
develop new active ingredients. Expanded insurance coverage is
"likely to make it worthwhile for companies to launch more new
drugs per therapeutic class and to develop more formulations and
indications per molecule."
84
However, new drugs are also likely to be more expensive,
increasing the strain on the Medicare budget. 85 Priority NMEs are
two-and-a-half times more expensive than older drugs, with an
average of $91.20 per prescription versus $37.20.86 Potential cost
79 See Review for Dual-Eligibles, supra note 27, at 5; see also Metge et al.,
supra note 70 (indicating that lower-income quintiles have special drug
requirements).
80 See HUNT, supra note 4, at 15-16.
81 See id. at 16 (indicating that ncreased demand from a previously untouched
segment of the market (i.e., low income groups) may serve to lessen the
financial pressures Hunt describes).
82 Review for Dual-Eligibles, supra note 27, at 5; see also Phelan & Link, supra
note 7, at 2 (describing relationship between lower incomes and increased
incident of disease).
83 See Review for Dual-Eligibles, supra note 27, at 5.
84 Danzon & Pauly, supra note 12, at 602 (detailing the extremely complex
relationship between insurance and the rate of pharmaceutical innovation and its
impact on total drug expenditures, and offering the alternative hypothesis that
the increase in pharmaceutical technology itself may lead to more demand for
expanded coverage, which feeds back to increase demand for new drugs,
increasing prices).
85 See HUNT, supra note 4, at 14.
86 id.
reductions in other areas may offset this strain,8 7 and the savings
realized from avoiding more expensive and invasive medical care
may be significant.88 However, Congress should be aware of the
tendency for new technological breakthroughs in medicine to lead
to a demand for more insurance coverage. 89 This tendency,
combined with an already fragile fiscal situation, could require
taxpayers to make a greater financial commitment to Medicare
than they are prepared to make.
Bearing in mind budgetary difficulties, the degree to which
demand stimulation and increased innovation might be
accomplished varies depending on the depth and width of the
coverage offered to low-income groups. H.R. 1 covers
significantly more low-income beneficiaries due to its inclusion of
dual-enrollees. 90 However, this coverage is not as extensive as that
in S. 1, given the much lower initial coverage limit of $2,000. 9 1
The hole in the doughnut is created by the gap between this low
initial coverage limit and the stop-loss threshold of $3,500. 92 As a
result of this hole, beneficiaries are uncovered for expenses
incurred up to the stop-loss threshold. 93 Beneficiaries at this
income-level are extremely price-sensitive, 94 and may significantly
87 See Scherer, supra note 77, at 113.
88 See Frank R. Lichtenberg, Are The Benefits of Newer Drugs Worth Their
Cost? Evidence From The 1996 MEPS, HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct. 2001, at 250.
89 See Danzon & Pauly, supra note 12, at 602.
90 Review for Dual-Eligibles, supra note 27, at 6.
91 Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 2003, H.R. 1, 108th
Cong. (2003), 1860D-2(b)(3).
92 The stop-loss threshold is essentially a catastrophic level of out-of-pocket
spending. H.R. 1 acts to mitigate catastrophic out-of-pocket expenses by
resuming coverage at this level.
93 Review for Dual-Eligibles, supra note 27, at 20.94 See Arthur A. Nelson, C. E. Reeder, & W.M. Dickson, The effect of a
Medicaid drug copayment program on the utilization and cost ofprescription
services, 22(8) MED CARE 724, 724 (1984); C. E. Reeder & Arthur A. Nelson,
The differential impact of copayment on drug use in a Medicaid Population, 22
INQUIRY 396 (1985). Nelson et al. found that following the implementation of a
50¢ copayment per prescription in South Carolina's Medicaid program, claims
dropped from 24.8 to 23 claims per prescription per recipient per year. The
subsequent study determined that the copayment caused a significant change in
use of cardiovascular, cholinergic, diuretic, and psychotherapeutic drugs.
See Adams, Soumenai, & Ross-Degnan, supra note 67, at 54 for a discussion of
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reduce drug consumption after the initial coverage limit, never
reaching the stop-loss threshold.
95
The sizable hole in the doughnut would lessen the
enhanced demand effect of the benefit under the House bill, not
only due to the size of the hole in the doughnut, but also because
the relatively low initial coverage limit.96 If beneficiaries begin to
reduce their drug consumption at this point (likely never reaching
the stop-loss threshold in most cases), a sizable portion of the
prescription drug requirements of the sickest and poorest enrollees
could go unaddressed; low-income demand for technologically
innovative drugs would decrease accordingly.
The introduction of NMEs is valuable to both the
healthcare system and to the economy. A recent study of medical
expenditure data indicates that new drugs are of better quality than
older drugs and that the introduction of new drugs reduces
morbidity and mortality, as well as spending on a variety of other
non-drug medical services.97 New drugs also lead to fewer missed
work days.98 The emerging use of genomics in the pharmaceutical
field may further enhance the value of new drugs if R&D costs
decrease99 and if medicine becomes increasingly cost-effective.'
00
Overall, it would appear that new technology is beneficial, both
from an economic and a medical perspective.
other controlled studies concerning the impact of copayments on the use of
prescription drugs.
95 Review for Dual-Eligibles, supra note 27, at 15.
96 H.R. 1, § 1860D-2(b)(3).
97 See Lichtenberg, supra note 88, at 250. Lichtenberg relies on the "quality
ladder" model of innovation, which favors new innovations to older products
due to a higher ratio of services offered in relation to their cost of production.
98 Id. at 250.
99 See Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals:
Balancing Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era,
2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 173, 180 (2001) (arguing that the use of genomics will
offer some reduction in research and development costs).
'
00 Id. at 205.
IV. Balancing Costs and Benefits
From the perspective of public finance, support for dual-
eligibles and the near-poor under a Medicare prescription drug
benefit program effectively represents a subsidy to drug
manufacturers. Although many criticize the already-high profits of
drug companies, society benefits from encouraging and fostering
research in new and more innovative pharmaceutical
technology. 101 It may be fairly said that
assuming that important new drugs yield substantial
consumer surplus [otherwise] untapped by their
developers, consumers.., lose along with the drug
companies. Should a tradeoff be required between
modestly excessive prices and profits versus
retarded technical progress, it would be better to err
on the side of excessive profits.'
0 2
The importance of innovative pharmaceuticals to society,
as well as the laudable goal of the provision of enhanced medical
care to low-income groups, should be weighed carefully against
the need for fiscal deliberation. 0 3 There is evidence that just as
insurance shifts demand for drugs, so newer, better drugs shift
demand for insurance.' 4 Already, Medicare is in near-constant
danger of fiscal insolvency; legislators must anticipate the rising
costs of healthcare generally, as well as the emergence of more
expensive pharmaceuticals, when crafting the prescription drug
benefit.105
101 Scherer, supra note 77, at 102.
102 Id. at 113.
103 See HUNT, supra note 4, at 18; see also Rai, supra note 79, at 179 (describing
pricing distortions as a result of insurance).
104 See Danzon & Pauly, supra note 12, at 602.
105 See, e.g., The Health Insurance Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2003, at A30
(discussing a variety of problems relating to health insurance, including federal
Medicare budgets, state Medicaid efforts and budget crises, and employer-
related concerns).
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Additionally, other provisions within the Medicare
prescription drug benefit plan, such as price control schemes10 6 and
a stricter use of formularies,' 0 7 could greatly reduce any positive
effect on pharmaceutical innovation. These would provide a
significant disincentive to innovate, given the already-noted
financial pressures on manufacturers to satisfy investors with
sizable profits. 10 8 Society must consider whether it is willing to
risk highprices in one arena in exchange for high returns in
another. 109
Often it is easy to mischaracterize the relationship between
insurance and drug prices and the impact on society of increased
prices.i l Although the contribution of moral hazard to more
expensive pharmaceuticals is marked, "there is no obvious basis
for labeling the insurance-induced rise in drug expenditures as
inefficient relative to other health care spending.""' Indeed, if an
ethical examination of the tendency for low-income groups to
under-utilize drugs is made, such stimulation of consumption may
be nothing other than positive, within certain limits.
112
The benefits conferred upon society-reduced mortality,
mitigated illness, decreased missed workdays, increased economic
gain, and advanced medical technology-play a large role in the
calculus of costs and benefits surrounding Medicare questions.
106 See Scherer, supra note 77, at 106. Both proposed plans feature extensive
"best price" negotiation elements. See HEALTH POLICY ALTERNATIVES, INC.,
supra note 37, at 7.
107 See HEALTH POLICY ALTERNATIVES, INC., supra note 37, at 6 (describing
formularies and covered drugs). Each bill proposes a similar use of formulary
lists, but it remains unclear how strictly they may be employed. Id.
108 See HUNT, supra note 4, at 15-16.
109 Scherer, supra note 77, at 113.
110 For example, Lichtenberg finds in an empirical analysis with three dependent
variables (mortality, morbidity, spending for non-drug medical events) that a
price increase of $18 per prescription for "new drugs" is offset by a $71.09
reduction in non-drug spending. See Lichtenberg, supra note 88, at 248.
... Danzon & Pauly, supra note 12, at 612; see also Scherer, supra note 77, at
103-04 (downplaying debate over pharmaceutical industry returns).
112 Phelan and Link theorize that the gap between wealth/health and
poverty/disease may actually be increasing, as access to new technology and
information is limited for low-income groups. See Phelan & Link, supra note 7,
at 3.
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These benefits have the potential to spill over from the low-income
population addressed by the Medicare prescription drug benefit to
a host of other demographics, crossing boundaries of age, working
status, and income level. Non-prescription medications may
similarly undergo more significant innovation as newly-developed
technology finds its way into other drugs. Taken with a measure
of fiscal caution and foresight, generous treatment of low-income
beneficiaries under a Medicare prescription drug benefit may have
a lasting positive impact for society at large, from economic,
medical, and technological perspectives.
V. Author's Postscript
After the completion of this Recent Development and
during the final editing process, Congress adopted a conference
agreement reconciling the House and Senate bills." 3 President
Bush signed the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003 into law on December 8, 2003.114 The
provisions in the adopted bill are largely a compromise between
those in the House and Senate versions. 115 The treatment of low-
income groups in the final bill generally reflects those
recommendations made in this Recent Development: dual-eligibles
are included in the benefit;' 16 the hole in the doughnut is
13 H.R. REP. No. 108-391 (2003), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov
/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 108_congreports&docid=fihr391.108.pdf (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
114 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173 (Dec. 8, 2003) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.). See CNN, Bush Signs Landmark Medicare Bill into Law, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/12/08/elec04.medicare/index.html
(Dec. 8, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
115 For a summary comparison of the three bills, see HEALTH POLICY
ALTERNATIVES, INC., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION,
PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE FOR MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES: A SIDE-BY-
SIDE COMPARISON OF S. 1 AND H.R. 1, AND THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT (H.R.
1), at http://www.kff.org/medicare/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/
getfile.cfm&PageID=28003 (Nov. 2003) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
116 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003
§ 1935(c)(6).
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significantly smaller with an initial coverage limit of $2,250, 1 17
and catastrophic coverage resumes at $3,600.118 These provisions
represent a more generous treatment of low-income groups than
those in earlier bills and should result in the development of more
technologically innovative drugs once the pharmaceutical industry
feels the impact of the benefit.
7 Id. at § 1860D-2(b)(3).
118 Id. at § 1860D-2(b)(4)(B).
100 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL.5
